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EXPERIENCE RATING: ITS OBJECTIVES, PROBLEMS
AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS*
EDWIN R. TEPLEt AND CHARLES G. NOWACEKI:
Within a decade, the system of rate differentiation which has become
one of the distinctive characteristics of the unemployment insurance
program in the United States spread from the North Woods to the
shores of the Gulf of Mexico. The idea so vigorously advocated by
Professors John R. Commons and Harold M. Groves, and their Wis-
consin colleagues, having been first put into effect under the Wis-
consin Law in 1938, was finally incorporated in the Mississippi Law
in 1948.1 Though unknown to the older European systems, experience
rating thus took a firm grip upon the program in this country.2
In the process of becoming universally accepted by the states, how-
ever, the original scheme underwent a rather complete metamorphosis.
The Wisconsin plan, incorporated in the first Wisconsin law, was based
on the reserve account principle, in which the possibility of reduced
contribution rates based upon favorable experience was inherent.
Most other states were unwilling to run the risk attending individual
employer reserves and adopted the so-called pooled fund type law,
sometimes referred to as the Ohio plan. With a pooled fund, a flat
contribution rate without individual variations was the simplest, and
perhaps the natural pattern, but the advocates of this type of law
* The views expressed herein are entirely those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official views of the Department of Labor or any other
agency of the Federal Government.
f Cleveland Attorney and Lecturer in Labor Law and Social Legislation,
Western Reserve University; formerly with the legal staff of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare and its predecessor agencies.
: Regional Employment Security Representative, United States Department
of Labor, Cleveland, Ohio; Lecturer on Economic and Accounting Subjects at
Western Reserve University and Fenn College; C.P.A.
1. There was not much occasion to worry about reduced contribution rates
during the early years of the unemployment insurance program in this
country, since benefits were not payable immediately under the terms of the
state laws, and under the provisions of Title IX of the Social Security Act
(subsequently incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code) no reduced rate
could be granted under pooled fund laws until there had been at least three
years of experience with respect to unemployment. When the critical period
arrived, however, most states were quick to take advantage of the additional
credit provisions of the federal law. It was two years before the next state
followed Wisconsin, but in 1940 the experience rating provisions of three states
went into effect. The others followed suit in succeeding years as follows:
1941-thirteen; 1942-seventeen; 1943-six; 1944-two; 1945-three; 1947-five;
1948-one.
2. When the House of Representatives first passed the original Act, Title IX
provided that all employers pay the same total tax rate; the Act was amended
in the Senate to permit additional credit under an approved experience rating
plan. The conference committee accepted the Senate provision which later
was enacted into law. Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin was active in the
efforts to obtain this highly significant revision.
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soon matched the pocketbook appeal of reserve accounts by working out
feasible arrangements to allow reduced rates within the structure of a
statewide pooled fund. As one early authority on the subject pointed
out: "If there are any sound arguments in favor of the Wisconsin plan,
they all can be met through a system of merit rating. '3 And that is the
pattern which dctually developed, even Wisconsin abandoning its
reserve account provisions in 1948, encouraged, perhaps, by the more
favorable terms in the federal law applicable to pooled funds.
Both the extent and the importance of the system may be gathered
from the fact that the rate reductions actually in effect in 1953 resulted
in total contributions being about $1.4 billion less than would have
been collected under a standard 2.7 percent rate; and from the be-
ginning of the program through the same year, contributions were
more than $10 billion less than they otherwise would have been.4
Obviously, this is destined to be a potent factor in any discussion
of the subject, particularly if abandonment or modification is under
consideration.
.EXPERIENCE RATING IN THEORY
One of the most striking features of experience rating in the United
States after nearly fifteen years of actual operation is its high survival
rate. Despite vigorous opposition both on theoretical and practical
grounds over the last decade and a half, experience rating on an in-
dividual employer basis has flourished and grown to maturity. What-
ever their convictions, students and administrators alike must
recognize and cope with its reality, not only from the standpoint of
day-to-day administrative problems and the growth and development
of the system, but also from the viewpoint of understanding its
underlying objectives.
This is not to imply that there is no longer room for conflicting
opinions and theories as to the desirability of individual employer
experience rating in unemployment insurance. That these conflicts
continue to rage is indication enough that, although fifty-one jurisdic-
tions now have adopted experience rating, the issue in both its
theoretical and political form has not been settled.
Objectives of Experience Rating
The system of differentiating individual employer rates on the basis
3. Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
64, 79 (1936). The term "merit rating" has since fallen almost entirely into
disuse, and the term "experience rating" now carries virtually the same con-
notation, at least for all practical purposes. The same author proved to be an
extremely accurate prophet when he said that "some provision for merit rating
is destined to become ... part of the rate-making system of unemployment
insurance in the United States, particularly so long as the present Federal
Social Security Act remains in force." 3 Id. at 81.
4. 1953 SUPPLEMENT TO HANDBOOK OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FINANCIAL
DATA 2 (U.S. Dep't Labor 1954).
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of their experience with unemployment has traditionally been justified
on three grounds. First, it is said that the employer, responding to the
incentive of the avoidance of a higher tax or the reward of a lower
tax, and being able within limits to control the volume and duration
of his employment, will manage his business in such a manner as to
minimize unemployment of his workmen. Second, it is argued that
the identification of the immediate cost of unemployment with the
individual employer or industry produces a desirable social and
economic effect.5 Third, the employer, it is claimed, will become an
interested party participating in the system, both as to its content
and its operation, only if he has some direct financial interest therein.
Prevention and Stabilization
The objective of unemployment prevention, or the stabilization of
employment, is undeniably a desirable one; it has a very high sales
appeal to employers and to state legislators.
The soundness of this objective, however, rests on the extent to
which the individual employer, responding to the tax incentive, can
alter his demand for workers, week by week, in order to regularize his
employment. The economic forces that work to change the levels
of employment for the economy as a whole, for a particular industry,
or for a particular employer, are, to a very large extent, forces
over which an individual employer has little or no control. Why
the demand for his product or the product of his industry changes,
rests essentially on a matter of consumer choice; a new machine
process or innovation which will reduce labor costs and total costs,
compels the manager, because of competition, to adopt the new idea
and reduce labor needs; national or international shifts in economic
or security policies may directly affect labor demands. Experience
rating is obviously not designed to check this type of employment
fluctuation. The system may, however, be expected at least to in-
fluence that irregularity of employment over which the management
of the concern does have some control.
How long the worker, after being laid off, continues to be unem-
ployed is generally related to the condition of the labor market, i.e.,
the number of job openings in other establishments, and the competi-
tion from other workmen for jobs. Once separated, an individualemployer can exercise very little control over the length of the
workers' unemployment, although there are some notable exceptions
revolving around the temporary interruption of employment of a
worker who continues for all practical purposes to be attached to
his 'last employer. Production interruptions, inventory needs, model
and design changes that result in temporary layoffs of hourly paid
5: For a discussion of the objectives of experience rating-unemployment
prevention "and cost allocation--see Arnold, Experence Rating, 55 YALx L.J.218, 219-23 (1945). "
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workers with seniority, for example, do affect the length of unem-
ployment and are within some control of the employer.
The strength of the unemployment insurance tax incentive to pro-
vide stable employment has frequently been challenged on the basis
that employers have other and more powerful incentives to stabilize
employment wherever possible, such as higher profits. With the
range in tax rates becoming more and more narrow in recent years
and with the increased popularity of non-charging provisions, there
are additional reasons for accepting this viewpoint.
Allocation of Costs
The second justification for experience rating is to achieve an
allocation of the cost of unemployment as between various industries
and various employers, which would have the effect of assessing such
costs against the economic product or service of the employer.
Under this view, experience rating is a system of cost accounting
according to which the dollar value of the wage loss actually
compensated will be "charged" to the various industries and employers
through the system of contribution rate differentials. Accordingy,
the burden of unemployment taxes will be distributed in relation to
the incidence of unemployment among particular industries and em-
ployers. Questions have been raised regarding the economic de-
sirability of this effect produced by experience rating. It is contended,
for example, that since unemployment is a general social problem,
the costs thereof should be shared on a joint basis rather than having
some industries penalized and other inherently stable industries
rewarded.
The economic undesirability of assessing the highe rates against
the durable and consumer-durable goods industries is frequently
stressed since stability of conditions in these industries, including the
stability of unemployment costs, may play a vital role in the stability
and growth of general economic conditions.
6
6. The economic effects of the payroll tax on the individual employer when
the tax is suddenly and sharply increased, are often such as to make it
difficult to pass costs forward to the consumer or backward to the worker.
According to the present structure of experience rating systems, the force
responsible for any sharp increases in contribution rates will at about the same
time, also produce a decreasing price level, or at best a stable price level. That
force is unemployment Both results will be fairly closely matched from the
point of view of time. To pass a contribution rate increase forward to the cus-
tomer under these conditions would be difficult. To pass it backwards to the
worker might appear easier except for wage contracts and worker pressure.
The ultimate effect on any industry or firm within industry will depend upon
its competitive position, upon its stage of development, expanding, stable, or
declining, and upon the elasticity of demand for its product. It is claimed,
also, that a flat tax rate does not treat industries uniformly since there is con-
siderable variation between firms and industries in the relationship of payrolls
to total costs. However, the risk of unemployment is associated directly with
the number of workers on the payroll, and the employer under a flat rate




The third justification for experience rating is that it provides an
incentive for the employer to participate as an interested party in the
unemployment insurance system. 7 Since the employer bears the
entire cost of both the administration of the program and the payment
of benefits thereunder O experience rating is the best means of pro-
voking and sustaining this interest. Flat rate contributions will not
achieve this end, it is claimed.
Participation by the employer as an interested party uider ex-
perience rating takes various forms. In the first place, and vital
to the proper administration of an unemployment insurance law, the
employer must participate by furnishing information regarding not
only wages and employment, but also the conditions surrounding
the workers' separation from employment and the reasons for the
unemployment. The employer, it is said, does this best when he has
some direct financial interest in the result.
Participation also takes the form of interest and activity in state law
changes as to the amount and duration of benefits, the disqualifications
and eligibility conditions, experience rating changes, and other changes
in the provisions of the state laws. Because of this interest in the
content of the state laws, employers are frequently held responsible
for the severe disqualification and eligibility conditions found in
many state laws, and for the tardiness of the states in general in
providing adequate unemployment benefit payments to workers for
a sufficient number of weeks. In addition, employers, either directly
or through fee-agencies, in the interest of minimizing benefit charges,
"police" the system of benefit payments and the appeals process.
There is rather violent disagreement as to the need for, or desirability
of, these types of employer activities;9 that they are induced by ex-
perience rating there seems to be no doubt.
was compelled by the market to reduce his work force. A flat rate of con-
tributions over a period of time would have a uniform effect so far as the
individual employer is concerned, with a consequent lower dollar payroll tax
when employment was reduced.
7. See Schmidt, Experience Rating and Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.J. 242 (1945).
8. Only Alabama and New Jersey provide for a worker's contribution to
unemployment insurance. In New Jersey the rate paid by the employee is 0.25
percent of the first $3000 in wages or salaries; in Alabama the employee's rate
is varied from 0.1 to 1.0 percent as the rate assigned to his employer varies
from 0.5 to 2.7 percent. Formerly, the following additional states provided a
worker contribution: California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. A worker contribution, of course, is in-
consistent with the principle of individual employer responsibility for unem-
ployment.
The only governmental contribution to the program was made in 1936-1938 In
the District of Columbia.
9. See Rainwater, The Fallacy of Experience Rating, 2 LAson L.J. 95, 96-97,
101-03 (1351); * f. Rector. The Frailty of the "Fallacyj of-Experience Rating, 2
LA.Zm Li. -3It 348-4 (1951).
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Much of the recent criticism of experience rating stems from the
participation in the program by the employer as an interested party,
chiefly on the grounds that this participation has seriously interrupted
changes and improvements in the system which it is assumed would
have been made if experience rating were not in the picture. Other
reasons, however, may have been responsible for at least some of these
interruptions.
Even without experience rating there would undoubtedly remain
a substantial interest in unemployment insurance and its administra-
tion among many employers and employer groups.
Joint or Individual Responsibility
A state unemployment insurance official recently based his op-
position to experience rating on the theory of collective responsibility:
"Unemployment is a phenomenon and an ever-present reality as much
attached to the economic order as the arms and legs are attached
to the human body. Being so, responsibility for it is collective rather
than individual, and, therefore, all the components--every employer
and every worker in every industry alike-are severally and jointly
responsible for it."1 He denies that the employer is at fault' or
is individually responsible for unemployment; i.e., unemployment,
inherent in a free economic society, cannot be said to be caused by
an individual or group of individuals; blame or reward, then, should
not be attached to the employer in the form of unemployment in-
surance differential tax rates. In his view neither logic nor equity
can justify experience rating since he challenges the premise under-
lying the system-individual employer responsibility. He states further
that because experience rating in state systems embodies this false
concept of employer responsibility, certain misconceptions about un-
employment insurance have developed. Among these are the notion
that a claim for benefits is a claim against an employer rather than a
state fund, that the payment of benefits takes the form of a penalty
assessment against the employer for causing the unemployment, and
10. See Rainwater, The Fallacy of Experience Rating, 2 LABOR L.J. 95, 96
(1951). On the nature of unemployment, it was recently stated that: "All the
experience in this country to date emphasizes the fact that, by and large, the
risk of unemployment is more closely associated with general economic con-
ditions than with conditions in a particular industry or establishment .... The
particular grouping of industries within State boundaries and the extent of
mobility across State boundaries will result in different State average benefit
costs, but the underlying factors are Nation-wide. The labor market within
which the risk of unemployment occurs is also in very large measure a national
market .... If interdependence is the basic feature of our type of economy,
the risk of unemployment should be regarded as a social risk arising out of the
nature of the economy and not a risk attaching specifically to individual em-
ploying units." MERRIAM, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING, 74-76 (FEDERAL SECURITY
AGENCY, BUREAU REPORT No. 17 1952).
11. For a discussion of employer fault in unemployment compensation, see
Simrell, Employer Fault v. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment
Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 181, 204 (1945).
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that any disagreement about the claim is between the employer and
worker with the state agency a mere onlooker.1
In challenging the concept of joint responsibility, Mr. Stanley
Rector states that there is no proof of the major assumption made by
opponents of experience rating that unemployment is inherent in
our economic system and that employers can do nothing to minimize
it. He categorically denies that the responsibility for unemployment
is joint and indivisible.13
Evidence available to show that employers will minimize their
risk if financial incentives are held out includes the early experience
in Wisconsin with Workmen's Compensation self-insurers, the results
of a 1940 Wisconsin Steadier Job Conference, and the 1947-48 ex-
perience of General Motors with job stabilization.14 This evidence
is offered to contradict the assertion that employers "can do nothing"
to minimize unemployment. 5 No more recent information or ex-
perience is available to demonstrate the success of stabilization
efforts in the field of unemployment insurance experience rating.
Under this concept, employers can individually exercise some con-
trol over the causes of unemployment in their establishment. The
difference between workmen's compensation and unemployment
insurance from this point of view is one of "degree only."'16 Because of
the smaller degree of control possible in unemployment insurance
compared to workmen's compensation, it is pointed out, the employer
is accountable directly for only a fraction of his costs of unemploy-
ment. The rate limits in unemployment insurance experience rating
are relatively narrow; beyond the highest tax rate the cost of un-
employment is in fact equally borne by all employers.17
Proposals are expected to be made by the United Automobile
Workers (CIO) to the auto manufacturers covering guaranteed an-
nual wage plans. In discussing the objectives of these plans, it was
recently stated ". . . the UAW proposal is not supplementary unem-
12. Rainwater, Fallacy of Experience Rating, 2 LABOR L.J. 95, 97 (1951).
See also id. at 101-03 for indictments of experience rating in actual operation.
13. Rector, The Frailty of the "Fallacy" of Experience Rating, 2 LABOR L.J.
338,340 (1951).
14. Id. at 341-44.
15. There is no agreement among economists as to the amount of unemploy-
ment that may prevail as a minimum in any functioning free private com-
petitive economy. Under a full-employment economy, assuming a non-war
condition, unemployment has reached recorded lows of less than 2.0 percent
of the civilian labor force. (August and October 1953, 1.9 percent and 1.8
percent, respectively.) A normal expected rate might approach 5.0 percent.
There is agreement, on the other hand, among economists that a certain mini-
mum amount of unemployment is inevitable, resulting from the free function-
ing of the system.
16. Rector, supra note 13, at 342.
17. Id. at 342-43. A comparison can be made between the maximum rate in
workmen's compensation (with premium rates as high as 20 to 30 percent of
payroll) and unemployment insurance (4.0 percent of payroll the highest, with
most states at 2.7 percent).
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ployment compensation because its objective is primarily to stabilize
employment and only secondarily to compensate workers for loss of
income."' 8 It is further stated that costs of the plans -can be held
substantially below maximum liability levels by employers "stabiliz-
ing employment to the great extent that it lies within their direct
power to do so iii individual plants."' 9
Here is agreement with the concept of individual employer responsi-
bility insofar as guaranteed annual wage plans are concerned. Many
of these plans are proposed to be integrated with public unemployment
insurance. Experience rating on an individual employer basis is con-
sistent with this concept of guaranteed annual wages.
Criticisms of Experience Rating
Actual operation of experience rating under a wide variety of
industrial and local conditions has removed many of the earlier
criticisms and doubts about the system.
Its general practicability was first questioned.20 The administrative
complexities of measuring the individual employer's risk of unem-
ployment, relating the result to other employers' experience, and the
final translation into contribution .rates, were frequently emphasized.
The anomalies resulting from the various methods of charging bene-
fits raised doubt that a satisfactory and administratively workable
scheme could be developed that would assess responsibility for un-
employment to the employer on a logical and equitable basis. In
practice, however, these difficulties, as well as other problems of
detail in content and operation, were overcome or evaporated when
their true dimensions were recognized.
The cost of experience rating operations in the states has also come
under attack from time to time. However, the costs do not appear to
be unreasonably high,21 amounting to 2.6 percent of the total adminis-
trative expenses for employment security purposes in 1952.
One of the most telling early criticisms of experience rating in its
original form of individual employer reserves, was the possible re-
18. WEINBERG, ANALYSIS OF SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GUARANTEED
ANNUAL WAGE, SUPPLEMENT TO PROCEEDINGS OF SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 28-30, 1953.
19. Ibid. To demonstrate the possibility of management action under finan-
cial incentives, the case of Workmen's Compensation and plant noise was used.
Management remained unconcerned about plant noise until a possibility arose
that workers might be able to collect on claims for deafness. When that be-
came a possibility, management took remedial action.
20. See LESTER AND KIDD, THE CASE AGAINST EXPERIENCE RATING IN UNEMPLOY-
MENT COMPENSATION 45-46 (INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNSELORS, INC., MONO-
GRAPH 2, 1939).
21. In the fiscal year 1952, total costs for direct experience rating operations
in all states amounted to $4,829,325 or the equivalent of 1,425 man years; this
compares with $2,165,148 expended during 1948 (878 man years). STUDY
OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF CHANGES IN STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
LAWS, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1952, A REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 28a (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1953).
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duction or interruption of benefits upon exhaustion of the employer's
reserve. This obvious and serious fault was quickly corrected so that
unemployed workers, so far as benefits were concerned, were treated
uniformly under the various state systems regardless of their former
attachment to a given employer. The only remaining individual em-
ployer reserve fund system,22 with its pooled account, has, in reality,
all the essential characteristics of a straight pooled fund.
The solvency and adequacy of the unemployment trust funds of the
states under experience rating conditions were often questioned.
There appears to be a natural antithesis between reduced contribu-
tion rates, which has been the situation under experience rating by
and large, and the need for reserve accumulations for purposes of
assuring the solvency of trust funds. The first need of the system was
considered to be a fund adequate in size, and with adequate revenue-
producing capacity, to sustain the anticipated withdrawals. Much of
the discussion in the literature of experience rating rests on this
concern for fund solvency.
While there are still some anomalies in the financial structure of
unemployment insurance in the United States, and also some critical
danger signs in a few states, most of the state reserves, by and large,
are solvent and adequate, thus belying the early concern for fund
solvency. The anomalies and dangers grow largely from conditions
within the individual states and cannot be attributed wholly to the
principle of experience rating.
On December 31, 1953, about $8.9 billion,2 3 or about 8.9 percent
of payrolls subject to state laws, was available in all states for bene-
fit purposes. If this fund were commingled and available to all
states, it would be sufficient to pay benefits for about six and one-
half years, based on the experience of the seven-year period, 1946-52.
Since the funds are not commingled but are accumulated separately
in each state, what is the condition of individual state funds?
Ordinarily a self-financing state unemployment insurance system
should have a reserve balance equivalent to from four to six times
the expected average annual benefit cost over an eight to ten year
22. The Kentucky Statute provides in part ". . . benefits shall be charged
against the pooled account only if and to the extent that a subject employer's
reserve account does not ... equal the maximum amount of benefits then due
and chargeable against such account. ... To the extent that money in the
pooled account is sufficient therefor, the Commissioner shall pay any benefits
otherwise due but not payable because of the complete exhaustion . . . of the
subject employer's reserve account." KY. REV. STAT., § 341.550 (2) (1948).
There is theoretical possibility that the pooled account will be exhausted while
substantial funds still are available to pay benefits to the workers of other
employers; but the present size and resources of the pooled account, and the
likelihood of state action before any such point is reached, make this result
very improbable.
23. The total funds available for benefits on December 31, 1953 amounted
to $8,912,821,000. 1953 SUPPLEMENT TO HANDBOOK OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE FINANCIAL DATA 2 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1954).
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period, with reserve accumulating to higher levels during prosperous
times and reducing to lower levels during periods of unemployment.2
Judged by this approximate measure -of adequacy, and considered
from the point of view of 1953, a year of prosperity, the reserves of
all but four or five states appear adequate. In twelve states the
reserves seem ekcessive, being locked into the state unemployment
fund with slight prospects of ever being needed or used. These states
could pay benefits for fifteen years or more from the accumulated
reserve (twenty-five years for Colorado and twenty-seven years for
Texas) without collecting any further contributions or receiving any
further interest on the fund. Ironically, these states have the least
need for a large reserve fund balance since they are the states with
the lowest benefit costs.
Significantly, the states with either dangerously low or less satis-
factory reserves are the states that, because of their high and fluctuat-
ing costs, need a greater reserve than the average state. The benefit
costs in each of these states was well above the national average. In
Rhode Island the reserve is capable of absorbing only about one and
one-half years of benefit payments. In that state, as well as in
Massachusetts and Alaska, experience rating has been suspended, and
employers paid contribution rates in 1953 at the standard uniform rate
of 2.7 percent. The reserves of these three states are the weakest of
all the states.
Most of the state funds under experience rating conditions are in
satisfactory condition and many have excessive balances in terms of
their potential liability. The states with the least satisfactory reserves.
could have improved the condition of their funds by better planning
in advance, by adopting sounder contribution rate tables, providing
a yield, if necessary, above 2.7 percent.
The reserve excesses which do exist in many of the states, of course,
might well be devoted to increasing the benefit protection afforded by
the state laws. That this has not occurred seems rather significant. A
higher level of benefit protection would not necessarily change the es-
sential behavior of the experience-rating system in raising revenue,
since more liberal benefits would be more or less automatically
financed under most of them.2
The early designers of experience rating in unemployment insur-
ance were also fully conscious of the primary need for a fund fully
capable of meeting in total its benefit obligations. Solvency standards
24. MERRIAM, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 79 (FEDERAL SEcURITY AGENCY,
BUREAU REPORT No. 17 1952).
25. The rates of firms paying at the maximum, and many paying at the
minimum over sustained periods, might not be affected by higher benefit dis-
bursements made to their unemployed workers unless the statutory rate tables
were changed. The higher benefit costs for firms paying at the maximum rates
would be averaged over all employers below the maximum.
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for individual reserve accounts were required as a condition for a re-
duced rate.26
The Federal requirements for pooled-fund laws contain no solvency
standards or indicators. The solvency standards required of reserve
account states provided a benchmark for writing adequate solvency
levels into state pooled-fund laws. In addition, as a condition of ap-
proval of a pooled-fund experience rating system, the Secretary of
Labor and his predecessor agencies, including the original Social Se-
curity Board, have always scrutinized plans submitted by the states
from the point of view of the solvency of the state fund.
In order to protect the fund solvency, special financing measures
have been built into thirty-two of the forty-two states that have estab-
lished a maximum rate of 2.7 percent.27 These measures normally sus-
pend reduced rates so long as the condition of the fund is in danger.
Contributing to the excessive reserves in many states was the over-
financing that was built into the original unemployment insurance
system.2 Wishing to avoid the possibility of deficit financing and to
establish clearly the reserve accumulation principle, the original de-
signers of the system required at least one full year of contribution
payments before benefits became payable. 29 Most of these reserve
accumulations were never needed.30 In only a few states were these
26. The federal standards for reserve account laws, INT. REV. CODE § 3303
(a) (3) (1954), provide that to be eligible for a reduced rate the balance of
any employer's account must equal the greater of either 21% percent of three
years' payroll or five times the highest annual amount of benefits paid during
the three preceding years.
27. Seven states allow no reduced rates if the fund falls below a specified
dollar amount, e.g., Indiana-$25.0 million; Colorado-$10.0 million; six states
permit no reduced rates if the fund level falls below a specified multiple of
benefits paid in a specified period, e.g., California-l.5 times the last year's
benefits; fourteen states will discontinue reduced contribution rates if
the fund level falls below a specified percentage of taxable payrolls in a
specified period, e.g., Connecticut-l.25 percent of the last three fiscal years,
and Maryland- 5.0 percent of the preceding year; five states use the greater
of a specified amount and a multiple of either the benefits paid or the taxable
wages. After studying various measures for protecting the solvency of the
fund, a committee of the Federal Advisory Council for Employment Security
recommended that the critical solvency point at which reduced contribution
rates would be suspended should be the level of the trust fund balance stated as
a multiple of the state average annual benefit cost. The measure expressed as
a formula is:
Current Fund Balance . Average Annual Benefits (for specified period)
Last Year's Taxable Payroll Average Annual Taxable Payroll (for same period)
The exact criterion in terms of this measure for judging a state fund as being
in critical danger, will depend to some extent upon the reserve policy of the
state and the characteristics of the probable potential risk of unemployment;
what is critical for one state is not necessarily critical for another.
28. Clague, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J.
53, 65 (1945).
29. This requirement created a reserve fund of a minimum of 2.7 percent of
payroll; in Illinois arid Montana the fund accumulated to 6.75 percent of pay-
roll before any benefits were paid.
30. The original Social Security Act made no provision for loans to states
for unemployment insurance purposes. There was no prohibition, of course,
against the states arranging their own borrowings outside of the Social Security
Act. The temporary loan provisions included as Title XII of the Social Security
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accumulations called upon during the first year of benefit payments.
Also, the standard state tax rate of 2.7 percent established in the
original Social Security Act to finance the state systems of unemploy-
ment benefits has proved, according to experience thus far, to be
significantly higher than necessary to finance current benefit costs in
most states.
In addition, the low benefit payments maintained in most state laws
helped to keep disbursements from rising and contributed to this
over-financing, as did the relief afforded many funds by the Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944. Some states, 31 anticipating excessive
post-war benefit withdrawals, adopted special "war-risk" tax pro-
visions which were assessed primarily against war-expanded in-
dustries, and in the case of military contracts on cost-plus terms this
extra cost was borne by the United States Government. These special
assessments were likewise never needed, as it subsequently developed,
to finance post-war benefits, and were utilized either to build the fund
to higher levels or to bring about lower rates to employers through the
operation of the experience-rating systems.
While most funds today are solvent, it remains for the future to
determine whether or not the fund-raising capacity of experience-
rating systems can adequately and quickly replenish the reserves
drawn down or exhausted by heavy cyclical unemployment.32 Cer-
tainly, to accomplish this over" a period of time the maximum rates
and the very low minimum rates (including, in nine states, a zero
rate) must be increased; this much is dictated by sound experience-
rating principles as well as sound solvency considerations.
Act (Advances to State Unemployment Funds)- expired on December 31, 1951.
Recently Congress passed the Employment Security Administrative Financing
Act of 1954 (P.L. 567) providing for a permanent $200 million loan fund which
is available to the states on a repayable basis, interest free. No state has yet
borrowed to provide funds for unemployment benefit purposes, although two
states, at the close of 1954, were eligible for loans under Public Law 567.
31. Wisconsin, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Oklahoma. About 1200 million was collected
under these provisions during the period 1943-1946.
32. With a level seven-year cost (1946-1952) of 1.5 percent or less in forty-
one states it may be possible to maintain the continuing adequacy of many state
reserves with a 2.7 percent maximum rate which may, if necessary, also become
the uniform flat rate. Should benefit scales be increased along the lines of
President Eisenhower's recommendation for weekly benefit amounts and
duration, undoubtedly the cost structures of the states would be affected and,
of course, the capacity of the experience rating systems to rebuild reserves
within a 2.7 percent maximum tax rate wotild be affected. With only nine
states providing for a maximum possible rate above 2.7 percent (going up to
4.1 percent), none of these being high-cost states, it seems inevitable that states
must increase their maximum contribution rate for those employers with the
greatest risk of unemployment. Despite this, the number of states with penalty
rates above 2.7 percent declined from seventeen in June, 1945, to nine as of
August, 1954, with only five of these establishing a maximum above 3.5 percent.
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COMPULSORY FEATURES OF THE FEDERAL LAW
While on the face of it the federal statute allowing additional credit
permits a state to exercise a choice of whether or not to set up a
system of individual employer experience ratings, as a practical mat-
ter this choice does not exist. The states, if they wish to bring
contribution yields more in line with benefit costs and to avoid ex-
cessive reserve accumulations, must accept some individual employer
rating scheme. With actual benefit costs in almost all states averaging
substantially less than 2.7 percent over sustained periods of time,
33
this absence of genuine choice in financing state systems when the
federal off-set tax is geared to a 2.7 percent standard rate has actually
forced some states to adopt experience rating merely to reduce the
current revenue to the fund.3 4 Under these conditions the federal law
is a source of compulsion requiring conforming state action, a result
applauded by advocates of individual employer experience rating
but condemned by the opponents of experience rating as well as by
those who advocate maximizing state initiative and choice in the
entire field of federal-state relations.
Proposals to amend the additional credit language of the federal
law have from time to time been suggested, recognizing in part the
need to restore freedom of action to the states.
The Advisory Council on Social Security reported a recommenda-
tion to the Senate Committee on Finance in 1948 that covered the
elimination of the individual employer experience rating requirements
contained in Section 3303 of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
35
The recommendation would have established a new federal unemploy-
ment tax rate of 1.5 percent evenly divided between employers and
employees, with an 80 percent credit off-set for contributions paid
into a state unemployment fund. Thus a minimum employer contribu-
tion rate of 0.6 percent would be set for state contribution purposes,
with the state otherwise free to finance its costs as it sees fit,
including experience rating if it chooses. In discussing its recom-
mendations for new experience rating standards the Council pointed
out that it "believes that the States should be left free to set
33. See note 69 infra, covering seven-year state costs, 1946-1952.
34. Six states delayed adopting experience rating because of their opposition
to the basic principle. One of these, Mississippi, steadfastly refused to accept
individual employer experience rating until July 1, 1948, as already noted.
The opposition in that state was due apparently to a genuine dislike for the
principle of experience rating on an individual employer basis. The state had
preferred to distribute an approximate 50 percent tax cut equally to all em-
ployers in the state on a flat-rate basis, but was unable to do so because of the
federal additional credit restrictions included in Section 3303 (a) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See Raiwater, The Fallacy of ExperienceRating: the Rebuttal, 2 LABOR L.J. 753, 760-61 (1951).
35. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE A REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FIANCE FROM THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SEN. Doc. No. 206,
80th Cong. 2d Sess. 30, 34 (1948).
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the higher rates uniformly for all employers and employees or to
relate the higher employer rates to the employer's individual ex-
perience with the risk of unemployment."
That the proposed recommendations would have the practical effect
of eliminating experience rating in its present form in the United
States is agreed by both its advocates and opponents. Mr. P. L. Rain-
water, referring to the recommendations of the Advisory Council
relating to experience rating, concluded that the suggested changes
in the Federal Standards "would undoubtedly have the practical and
highly beneficial effect of each state's abandoning it."' 7 Without
agreeing to the "highly beneficial effect of its abandonment," Mr.
Stanley Rector correctly reflects the opinion of most advocates of
experience rating in concurring with Mr. Rainwater that this pro-
posal, or similar proposals advanced for amending the federal addi-
tional credit requirements, would have the practical effect of the
states' abandoning experience rating.m He goes on to predict that
the issue of experience rating in unemployment insurance will be
resolved on the Congressional front.39
EXPERIENCE RATING SYSTEMIS
Structure of Plans
While five different systems of experience ratings are in use by the
states, each having its own peculiar effect on the actual rates estab-
lished as between various employers, the structural form of all systems
follows a similar pattern.
The first thing to look for is the measure of unemployment risk. It
may be benefits paid to eligible workers, wages paid to workers re-
ceiving benefits, payroll declines, or combinations of these or other
factors.
In Workmen's Compensation, because the employer-employee re-
lationship prevails at the time of the injury, it is comparatively simple
to identify the employer in whose plant the worker was injured. The
total cost of the injury, regardless of its duration, can be traced and
charged to that employer. In Unemployment Insurance, except in the
cases of reduced hours of work and short-time temporary layoffs,
unemployment, and particularly compensable unemployment, occurs
after the terrhination of the employer-employee relationship and
36. Id. at 34. The Council also stated in its report that it "believes that, after
establishing certain safeguards, the Federal Government should leave to the
States the option of maintaining experience rating plans." If this were possible,
it would eliminate a continuing source of friction between the states and the
Federal Government.
37. Rainwater, The Fallacy of Experience Rating, 2 LABOR L.J. 95, 99 (1951).
38. Rector, The Frailty of the "Fallacy" of Experience Rating, 2 LABOR L.J.
338,339 (1951).
39. Id. at 338.
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therefore cannot be clearly associated with a particular employer.
How long the worker remains unemployed depends more on the con-
ditions of the labor market than on the actions of any individual
employer. In many cases, however, these difficulties disappear be-
cause a large proportion of workers are attached traditionally, and in
recent years more and more frequently, to a single employer. In addi-
tion, the worker's best prospect for re-employment is frequently with
his separating employer.
To classify employers according to their relative incidence of un-
employment, regardless of size, the payrolls of the various firms
are most commonly used as the measure, resulting in a form of
index. This index of relative unemployment in terms of the selected
measure of unemployment risk is translated into actual contribution
rates. A rate schedule is usually used for this purpose.
Special adjustments may be made, either increasing or decreasing
the rate, before it is actually assigned to the employer. These adjust-
ments may be for solvency purposes, taking the form of alternative
rate schedules, depending upon the solvency conditions of the total
fund; they may be used to spread a sharp increase in the employer's
rate over several years: or they may be used to assess an additional
fraction of a percent to finance a portion of the costs of employers
with the greatest risk of unemployment.
All states redetermine each year the new rate applicable to each
employer subject to the state law, generally on a calendar year
basis. The effective date for the new tax rate in practically all states is
January 1. The date for assembling the experience factors and
computing the rates is six months earlier in many states. Employers
generally are not notified of the new rate until sometime after Janu-
ary 1, but usually before April when the first quarterly contributions
are due.
Meaning of Three Years' Experience
The Internal Revenue Code requires a minimum of three years40 of
experience "with respect to unemployment or other factors bearing
a direct relation to unemployment risk." In the states that use benefit
payments, or a derivative of benefit payments, as the factor bearing
a direct relation to unemployment, an employer's three years' ex-
perience can include only the period during which benefits paid to
his former workers can be charged to his record. As a result, three
40. Under a recent Act of Congress (Pub. L. No. 767, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Sept. 1, 1954), states may choose to base the rate for an employer with only one
year's experience on that single year and to base the rate for an employer with
two years' experience on those two years. If forty-five months was the mini-
mum contribution liability period for the three years of unemployment experi-
ence, then twenty-one months (forty-five less twenty-four months) and thirty-
three months (forty-five less twelve months) would be the minimum contribu-
tion period for the one-year and two-year periods respectively.
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years of contribution liability is not synonymous with three years of
experience with unemployment.
In many states six months elapse between the computation date
and the effective date of the contribution rates; this adds six months
to the required thirty-six months of experience since there is no op-
portunity during this period to record any unemployment experience.
The administrative agency computes the contribution rates during this
six-month period. Too, because of the combined effect of the coverage
provisions of the state law and the methods of determining and
charging benefits, additional time is required, after the employer be-
comes liable under the law, in order that the unemployment ex-
perience of his workers, in the form of benefit payments, can be
reflected in the employer's record.
The length of time an employer must pay contributions at the
standard rate depends upon the interplay of several provisions of the
state laws: the date provided for the computation of rates, the effective
date of the rates so computed, the definition of employer, the definition
of "base period" and "benefit year," and the method provided for
charging benefit payments to employers. Under state laws which
contain the typical pattern of governing provisions,41 the minimum
period during which an employer newly subject to the law must pay
contributions at the standard rate of 2.7 percent is four years, and
the maximum period is five years.
Experience Rating Formulae
Reserve-Ratio
Of the five systems in use, the reserve-ratio is the most common,
having been adopted by thirty-three states; it has also been in use
longer than any other. This system establishes an "account" for each
individual employer subject to the act; this account is maintained so
long as the employer continues to be subject. While these are
memorandum accounts used strictly and solely for measuring the
risk of unemployment, in practice they frequently and erroneously
41. The typical pattern is one which has an effective date for contribution
rates on January 1; a computation date on the preceding June 30; the definition
of "employer" as a person having a specified number of workers in each of 20
different weeks in a calendar year; the definition of "base period" as the first
four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the
filing of a claim which begins a "benefit year"; and a provision for charging
benefit payments to "base period employers," i.e., employers who paid wages to
the worker in the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters. "Bene-
fit year," in its simplest terms, is merely the twelve-month period beginning
with the date on which a claim for benefits is first filed.
The necessary period of contribution liability will be shorter if a state pro-
vides for a different combination such as charging benefit payments to the
most recent rather than to all base-period employers, introducing no time lag
between the base period and the benefit year or between the computation date
and the effective date for contribution rates, or if the statutory period for
becoming an employer subject to the law is shorter.
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are assumed to be bona fide fund accounts of the employers, repre-
senting their equity in the system. The employer's stake in the
account is real, however, since it reflects his individual experience
upon which a future tax obligation will be fixed.
The traditional accounting debits (dr.) and credits (cr.) are followed
in the day-to-day functioning of the system, with contributions col-
lected being credited to the account and benefits paid being debited
(charged). Other miscellaneous debits and credits may be made to
the account, such as overpayments, errors in charging, etc..
The concept of the account balance, too, follows accounting prin-
ciples. The account balance is determined by deducting total cumu-
lative benefit charges (plus other debit actions) from total cumulative
contributions collected (plus other credit actions). This balance,
stated as a ratio of the employer's payroll, provides the reserve ratio
which is used to compare employers one with another.
The interaction of three factors of unemployment insurance experi-
ence determines the reserve ratio: the total tax contributions paid by
the employer, the total benefits paid to his workers, and the payroll
of the employer as the measure of the extent of the exposure.42 When
benefit charges exceed contributions the account is considered over-
drawn; in most states, this account deficit must be offset by future
contributions before the employer is entitled to a reduced rate.
The computed ratio shows the dollar balance in the reserve account
per each $100 of the employer's payroll. A high ratio under this plan
indicates a favorable experience with unemployment risk; a low ratio
indicates an unfavorable experience.
Benefit-Ratio
Five states43 employ the benefit-ratio system of experience rating.
As in the reserve-ratio states, the amount of benefits paid to unem-
ployed workers is used as the measure of unemployment risk. This
system does not involve the concept of an account balance; annual
benefits charged to an employer become a statistical factor in the rate
computation and then are discarded.
All five states use a three-year period, which is the minimum period
under the federal law, for the measurement of the risk. The benefits
for the three years are related to the taxable payrolls for the three
years for each employer and a benefit ratio is computed. This ratio
in effect shows the per-dollar cost of benefits for each employer over
42. The predominant factor is the amount of benefits paid; except for em-
ployers at the minimum and maximum rates, contributions received over a
period of time will approximate benefits paid. The reserve ratio then measures
the employer's most recent experience with unemployment. The final tax
rate may be modified because of expansion or contraction in the exposure base
(payrolls) but this does not impair the measure as related to benefits paid.
43. Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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the past three years. Under this plan the ratio varies directly with
the degree of risk of unemployment; a high benefit ratio is the equiva-
lent of a high degree of risk.
This plan is designed to replenish within the immediate future the
benefits paid from the fund during the past three years. A high volume
of unemploymeit, particularly cyclical in character, would result in
immediate high contribution rates, an effect which economically should
be avoided. Under this plan, however, the rate impact on an employer
of a very high volume of unemployment in his individual establish-
ment is limited to the immediate three-year period since the benefits
are not permanently charged to his account as in the reserve-ratio
system.
Benefit-Wage Ratio
The benefit-wage ratio plan is followed by six states." When a
worker files a claim for benefits and actually receives some benefits,
under this plan all the wages paid to that worker by the separating em-
ployers are potentially usable in computing benefits and become, there-
fore, "benefit wages." The benefit wages are those wage payments made
by employers during the claimant's base period; the process of
charging these against the separating employers occurs only once
during the claimant's benefit year. The charging of benefit wages may
not take place, in most of these states, unless the claimant receives
some benefits.
45
On the computation date the aggregate of the benefit wages assessed
against an employer during the last three years is divided by the em-
ployer's total taxable wages to arrive at a proportion of his total wages
that have become potentially chargeable with benefit payments under
the law. This ratio becomes his index of experience; employers with
the lowest index, being employers with the best experience, receive
the most favorable rate.
An essential part of the plan also requires the computation of a "state
experience factor," which is the relationship between total benefit pay-
ments in the state and the total of benefit wages assessed against all
employers. The final contribution rate is determined by multiplying.
each employer's index of experience by the state experience factor,
which is facilitated by a table.
This plan, as in the case of benefit-ratio plans, is based on the theory
of immediately replenishing the fund. The state experience factor is
an expression of the amount of benefits paid in the state per dollar
of benefit wages, and this is the fraction, in terms of benefit wages,
44. Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia.
45. In Alabama and Oklahoma this is not until payment is made for the
second week of unemployment; in Illinois and Virginia, until the benefits paid
equal three times the weekly benefit amount; and in Texas, until the benefits
paid equal the weekly benefit amount.
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that must be replaced in the fund. This replenishment amount is in
effect assigned to employers in the form of rates distributed according
to the various employers' indices of experience.
These plans, based on benefit wages, differ sharply from the plans
using benefits actually paid and charged to the individual employer.
The length of time the unemployed worker receives benefits is not
fully taken into account in the application of the measure to the in-
dividual employer. Through the influence of the "state experience
factor," the employer is sharing the cost of the average state-wide
duration of benefits.
Payroll Variation
Payroll variation plans are in effect in five jurisdictions, 46 these states
being among the last to adopt individual employer experience rating.
These plans are different from all others, inasmuch as they accept as
the measure of unemployment risk a factor entirely removed from
benefit payments. Under these plans an employer's experience with
unemployment is determined by measuring the declines in his total
payroll, either quarterly or annually, on the assumption that total
payrolls reflect the employer's ability or inability to provide employ-
ment. Where annual declines are employed, the effect of seasonal and
other types of intermittent unemployment is ignored. A low contribu-
tion rate under a payroll decline system is associated with no decrease
or a very slight percentage decrease in payrolls.
In several states the plan takes the form of a surplus distributed to
employers as credit certificates which may be used against the em-
ployer's future tax obligation. The amounts of the certificates are
determined on the number of points assigned to the employer on the
basis of his experience with annual payroll declines in relation to his
taxable payroll.
Compensable Separations
A plan of weighting worker separations from a given employer by
the amount of the worker's weekly benefit payment is employed by
one state, Connecticut, and is known as the compensable-separations
method. A rating index is calculated for each employer by dividing
the employer's total payroll for three years by the total of the weighted
separations. 'Employers with the lowest rating index receive the
highest contribution rates. Provision is also made for the distribution
of a surplus in the fund above a defined level. This surplus distribution
takes the form of credit memoranda usable against the next year's con-
tribution, and is made in proportion to the amount of the employer's
payroll.




When benefits or benefit wages are used as the measure of unemploy-
ment risk, alternative methods are employed by the states for charging
the benefits or wages to individual employers. The charging process
endeavors to identify the employer or employers responsible for the
unemployment being compensated and assesses the incurred benefit
costs accordingly.
47
Most states (twenty-two) charge benefits or benefit wages in pro-
portion to base period wages on the basis that the cause of the unem-
ployment cannot be precisely related, in multiple-employer cases, to a
particular employer, and that any benefits paid to the worker are de-
rived from all base period wage payments. Fourteen states charge
base-period employers in inverse chronological order, with a maximum
amount that can be charged to a given employer determined usually
as a fraction of the wages paid or employment furnished by that em-
ployer. The theory supporting this method is that the most recent
employer is more responsible than earlier employers for the indi-
vidual's unemployment and therefore should be charged first. Where
duration is long there is little difference between the inverse chrono-
logical order of charging and proportional charging. In eight states
the most recent employer, or the most recent employer in the base
period, because he is considered primarily responsible, receives the
?ntire charge for the benefits, unless the worker was only casually or
intermittently employed by that employer.
Non-Charging Provisions
In those states using benefits as the measure of the risk of unemploy-
ment, there has been a growing tendency to omit various types of
benefit payments from the employer's experience. These omissions,
while affecting employers in different ways, do not impair the measure
:f unemployment risk based on benefit payments so long as the benefits
47. The matter of charging benefits to a particular employer's account has
been considered sufficiently significant in several instances to warrant testing
the question in court, even to the point of appealing to the court of last resort.
Apart from the principle of the thing, or course, such action might be highly-
worthwhile financially in any case where the condition of the account is such
that the employer is teetering, so to speak, between two contribution rate
brackets, his rate for the ensuing year depending upon which bracket he finally
falls into.
The charging of benefits is held to be erroneous where the employer has not
been notified prior to the final determinaticn of the former employee's right to
receive such benefits. Call v. Luten, 219 Ark. 640, 244 S.W.2d 130 (1951) (notice
given prior to original disallowance of the claim, but not before a redetermi-
nation allowing benefits); Bell-Brook Dairies, Inc. v. Bryant, 35 Cal.2d 404,
218 P.2d 1 (1950). In Horsman Dolls. Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 7
N.J. 541, 82 A.2d 177 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 890 (1951), however, it was
held that notice to the employer that a claim had been filed was sufficient for
this purpose; notice of the allowance thereof not being required, particularly
where the lay-off in question occurred during the slack season. Note that in
either case the payment of benefits is not affected.
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which are charged assure a reasonable measurement of experience
with respect to unemployment.
48
Historically, payments of unemployment benefits made to workers
on the basis of a double affirmation clause,49 have not been charged to
the employer's account where the determination was subsequently
reversed.
In California, while duration of benefits reaches twenty-six weeks in
many cases, only the first eighteen weeks are chargeable to the
accounts of individual employers. Presumably the measure of unem-
ployment risk calculated on the basis of eighteen weeks rather than
the twenty-six-week maximum duration, is a reasonable measurement
of the employers' experience with unemployment generally. On the
same grounds, certain payments made under interstate agreements to
combine wage credits for workers not eligible under any state law
are not charged to any employer's account.
48. There have been several instances where state provisions for the omission
of benefit charging have been found to conflict with the broad test of Section
3303 (a)1(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
In 1940 the Oregon Law contained a provision (§ 126-716) authorizing the
state commission to relieve employers from benefit charges "where the un-
employment of the individuals to whom benefits are paid is due to an act
of God, catastrophe not attributable to the employer, or by operation of law."
The original Social Security Board determined that this provision would pre-
vent a true reflection of the employers' experience with unemployment and it
was subsequently repealed. ORE. LAws 1941, c. 448. Interestingly enough, in
the interim, a problem of interpretation arose which finally reached the
Supreme Court of Oregon. In Woodard Lumber Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, 173 Ore. 333, 145 P.2d 477 (1944), it was held that unemploy-
ment resulting from the government's acquisition of property by purchase
was caused neither by "catastrophe nor attributable to the employer"
nor by "operation of law."
An Ohio provision omitting charging where the unemployment was caused
solely by the permanent closing down of a mine or quarry because of exhaus-
tion, likewise was met with an unfavorable ruling by federal officials.
An amendment to the Alabama Law (Act 862, Laws of 1953) would have
permitted employers' accounts to be relieved from charging in any case where
the business ceased or curtailed its operation because the plant had been
destroyed or severely damaged by fire, explosion, flood, tornado, windstorm or
earthquake occurring after April 1, 1953. In an unfavorable ruling, the Secre-
tary of Labor pointed out that the only rationale for finding such a provision
in conformity with Section 3303 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code would be
that an employer should not be charged unless the unemployment compensated
is within his control. To so construe the federal requirement, it was added,
would mean that, as a practical matter, very few, if any, charges could be re-
quired. As a result of the ruling, the provision never took effect.
Somewhat similar proposals in at least six other states were not enacted
when the state authorities were informed of the likelihood of conflict with the
federal standard.
The Michigan legislature, on the other hand, amended its law in 1954 to
provide that only 60% of the benefits paid during 1946 should be charged to
employers' accounts. This provision was enacted in connection with a change
from the benefit-ratio to a reserve-ratio system of experience rating. One of
the primary purposes of its adoption, of course, was to equalize between all
employers a portion of the high postwar benefit charges against employers
heavily engaged in war contracts. This approach to the problem, permitting
only a partial omission of charging, has not been found inconsistent with the
requirement of the Internal Revenue Code.




The omission of charges to employers' accounts is also justified on
other grounds. It is recognized, for instance, that benefits paid for
unemployment resulting from an act of the worker, or from circum-
stances peculiar to the individual worker, need not be charged. Thus,
benefits paid following a period of disqualification for voluntarily
quitting work without good cause attributable to the employer, for dis-
charge for misconduct, or for refusing suitable work without good
cause, may be omitted.50 Also, benefit allowances paid for dependents
of the unemployed worker need not be charged since the award of such
additional benefits is based on conditions peculiar to the individual
worker. Thirty-six states authorize no charge for benefits paid follow-
ing disqualification for a voluntary quit, thirty-five after a discharge for
misconduct, and ten after a refusal of suitable work. In eight of the
eleven states that now pay dependents' allowances, the employers'
accounts are relieved of any charge for these extra payments.
The experience rating effect of the non-charging devices is to narrow
further the limits within which the employer is held financially respon-
sible and accountable for the cost of unemployment insurance paid to
his former workers. The share of the total trust fund payments that
are borne by all employers in the state, irrespective of their individual
experience, has increased under these provisions.
Voluntary Contributions
A voluntary contribution made by an employer under a reserve-
ratio system of experience rating has the same effect on the employer's
experience with unemployment as a required contribution. The em-
ployer's contribution is simply received under these circumstances
earlier than the law otherwise requires.
Contributions voluntarily made, which change the employer's rate
from what it would have been, based on the compulsory provisions
of the law, are perhaps an equitable means of overcoming the arbitrary
effect of the statistical groupings which are part of the process of
fixing the final rate. There may be very little difference between one
employer's experience with unemployment and that of another, and
yet one of them may fall into the next lower rate bracket. What
difference there is may actually be much less than the spread between
other employers in the same rate bracket. By making a voluntary pay-
ment, where this is permitted by the express terms of the state law, the
employer may be able to overcome the arbitrary nature of the statis-
50. An extension of this principle may be found in a West Virginia. case
holding that benefits paid to workers who refused to go through picket lines
were not chargeable against the employer's account, the court considering
that this amounted to a voluntary leaving for good cause not attributable to
the employer, no "labor dispute" being involved. State v. Ruthbell Coal Co.,




tical interval written into the law and qualify for a lower rate.51 This
device may be very profitable for employers close to the bottom of a
rate bracket.
Establishment and Transfer of Experience-Rating Accounts
In compliance with the express requirement of the federal law, all
state laws require three years of chargeability before a contribution
rate lower than 2.7 may be acquired by any new employer.52 Aside
from the effect which this provision may have upon businesses being
started for the first time, an established business may fall into the same
category, i.e., become a new employer as a matter of law, in cases of
merger, consolidation, or reorganization. This will occur, for instance,
when an individual decides to incorporate his business, or where the
members of a partnership change. Such cases frequently raise difficult
problems in connection with the retention of a reduced contribution
rate which may have been previously acquired by the business. The
so-called successorship provisions, which govern the acquisition of a
predecessor's "account," are the key to such problems under most state
laws.
All states now provide for the transfer of the predecessor's "account,"
either on a mandatory or optional basis, where the successor, whether
new or previously subject to the act, has acquired the entire business.
Delaware and Nevada limit such transfers to cases where the business
is acquired through a merger, consolidation, or other type of reorgani-
zation which involves no change in ownership or control. Nevertheless,
questions concerning the acquisition of the reduced rate of a prede-
cessor have frequently been the subject of litigation.53 Where a rate
51. Twenty reserve-ratio states permit voluntary contributions. In addition,
Minnesota permits voluntary contributions to offset benefits in connection with
the computation of the benefit ratio.
52. There has been some question about whether the required years of
chargeability had to be consecutive. The federal law, as well as some state
laws, originally did not specifically require them to be consecutive, although
the federal law was so interpreted from the beginning. In one case, however,
it was held that the three years did not have to be consecutive in the absence
of express language to that effect. Hansen v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 239 Iowa
1139, 34 N.W.2d 203 (1948). The requirement is now specific in both the Iowa
act and the Internal Revenue Code. Some states require contribution liability
for four years, and it has been held that all four years need not be consecutive
where the state law so specifies with respect to the last three years only.
Commonwealth v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 360 Pa. 230, 61 A.2d 350 (1948). In a
petition for redetermination of an employer's rate, it must appear that his
account has been chargeable with benefits during the three preceding years,
an allegation that contributions had been paid for the required period being
insufficient for this purpose. First National Bank v. Florida Ind. Comm'n, 154
Fla. 74, 16 So.2d 636 (1944). Accord: Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Lumber
Distributors, Inc., 74 Ariz. 388, 250 P.2d 79 (1952).
53. In this connection, failure to appeal an erroneous assessment against a
successor within the time fixed by the statute renders the rate final. Acme
Engineering Co. v. Jones. 150 Ohio St. 423, 83 N.E.2d 202 (1948). Questions of
constitutionality, although frequently raised against other provisions of the
unemployment insurance laws, have seldom been directed to the experience
rating sections. Experience rating, as embodied in the Illinois law, was found
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substantially lower than the standard 2.7 is at stake, a great deal may
depend upon the outcome of a case of this type, insofar as the employer
is concerned.
There have been a number of cases involving partnerships. Where
the management and control remain in the same hands, it is usually
considered that the experience of successive partnerships may be com-
bined in determining eligibility for a reduced rate.M But the converse
is true, under the ordinary successorship provision, where the control
falls into different hands.55
The problem is essentially the same where other forms of ownership
are involved.5
There has been some difference of opinion as to the right of transfer'
where there is no express legislative provision authorizing the transfef
of experience. At least one jurisdiction has refused to disregard distinct
legal entities under such a circumstance, 7 but in another it was held
that the corporate form can be disregarded for this purpose, substance
rather than form being considered controlling.
58
to be neither arbitrary nor in violation of the equal protection clause, and
therefore constitutional. Conlon Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Annunzio, 409 Ill. 277, 99
N.E.2d 119 (1951). The successorship provision of the Missouri law, which
placed the successor in the same position as the predecessor and made the
former liable for the delinquent contributions of the latter, was also upheld in
the face of constitutional attack. Bucklin Coal Mining Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, 356 Mo. 313, 201 S.W.2d 463 (1947).
54. Arado v. Keitel, 353 Mo. 223, 182 S.W.2d 176 (1944) (two out of three
members of the old partnership also constituted a majority and had control in
the new partnership)(; Bartels v. Director of Div. of Emp. Sec., 326 Mass.
1, 92 N.E.2d 370 (1950) (partnership succeeded to business previously
operated under a trust agreement; management and control of the business not
materially changed); Lindley v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E.2d 832 (1944)
(three successive partnerships owned or controlled by substantially the same
interests; the employment experience of all three might be combined in de-
termining eligibility for a reduced rate).
55. Billett v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 454, 59 N.E.2d 812 (1945) (partnership and
predecessor corporation not permitted to combine their experience where five
of the partners who owned 82 percent of the partnership assets had owned only
38 percent of the stock of the corporation),; Schlosberg v. District Unemp. Comp.
Bd., 167 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1938), (arrangement under which partnership
leased and operated a plant owned by a corporation, involved more than a
mere change in form, the management and control thereof having shifted from
the corporation to the partnership).
56. A corporation merging with a former subsidiary was held entitled to th6
latter's "merit" rating as a successor in interest. Texas Co. v. Florida Ind.
Comm'n, 155 Fla. 536, 20 So.2d 680 (1945),. But there must be substantial con-
tinuity in the business enterprise in question. Honeymead Products Co. v.
Christgau, 234 Minn. 108, 47 N.W.2d 754 (1951) (the third owner of a business
denied the experience record of the first owner, either as the successor directly
or through the second owner thereof, the latter having been long out of busi-
ness). Under the express provisions of twenty-five state laws, there can be no
transfer if the enterprise acquired is not continued, and in four of these (Dis-
trict of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin), the successor must
employ substantially the same workers. COMPARISON OF STATE UNEmpLOYVmENT
INSURANCE LAws 26 (Bur. of Emp. Sec., U.S. Dep't of Labor 1954).
57. Lund & Co. v. Rolfe, 93 N.H. 280, 41 A.2d 226 (1945)1 (partnership took over
the manufacturing business of a predecessor corporation; "merit" rating of the
latter was disallowed to the successor unit).
58. Packard Clothes, Inc. v. Director of Div. of Emp. Sec., 318 Mass. 329,
61 N.E.2d 528 (1945). In this case a corporation succeeded to the business of
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Acquisition of the entire business is not always necessary in order to
be entitled to the predecessor's contribution rate. Thirty-five state
laws authorize partial as well as total transfers.59 In these states, if
only a portion of a business is acquired, that part of the predecessor's
record which pertains to the acquired portion may be transferred to
the successor.60 In the absence of such authorization, however, it is
generally held that entitlement to a lower rate goes only with a trans-
fer of the whole business.
61
Considerable difficulty has been encountered in cases where a busi-
ness has been split up and divided among several successors. In some
states it has been held that the successors are still entitled to the re-
duced rate of the predecessor, 62 but in others a reduced rate has been
denied, usually on the basis of a statutory requirement that the busi-
ness must be continued by the successor as a single employing unit.63
an individual. The corporation, according to the court, although a separate
legal entity, was the successor in fact and entitled to the "merit" rating of the
predecessor. A 1943 amendment permitting transfers was considered to have
disclosed the legislative intent, and the Rolfe case was further distinguished on
the basis that the same identity of interest did not there exist.
59. COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS 25-26 (Bur. of
Emp. Sec., U.S. Dep't of Labor 1954).
60. Where the predecessor owned two restaurants, one of which had
twenty-two employees and the other four, it was held that a successor to the
first and larger establishment was entitled to the predecessor's rate. Indiana
Emp. Sec. Div. v. Ponder, 121 Ind. App. 51, 92 N.E.2d 224 (1950). See also,
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 239 Iowa 752, 32
N.W.2d 792 (1948) (railroad subsidiary which operated both a truck division
and a bus division transferred former to another subdivision, with no change in
the organization thereof; held that the successor subsidiary was entitled to the
reduced rate of the predecessor).
61. Emp. Sec. Comm'n of North Carolina v. News Pub. Co., 228 N.C. 332,
45 S.E.2d 391 (1947) (corporation acquiring the assets of only the printing
department of a publishing company not permitted to obtain the latter's ex-
perience rating "account"); Eiber Realty Co. v. Dunifon, 84 Ohio App. 532,
82 N.E.2d 565, 53 Ohio Abs. 33 (1948). In the latter case, the court referred
to the fact that the Ohio Legislature had struck out the phrase "in whole or
in part" in the provision governing transfers. The Ohio law has since been
further amended to allow transfer of a "clearly segregable and identifiable
portion of an employer's enterprise."
62. Royal Jewelers Co. v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 254, 205 S.W.2d 963 (1947) (three
corporations formed to take over the business of a partnership). The court
mentioned the fact that the three corporations had been combined for tax
liability purposes, and ruled that the statute did not clearly require that the
successor must be a single unit to succeed to the predecessor's rate.
63. El Queeno Distributing Co. v. Christgau, 221 Minn. 197, 21 N.W.2d 601
(1946) (original partnership reorganized into two corporations and a new
partnership, each operating separate businesses in different localities); Ned's
Auto Supply v. Michigan Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 313 Mich. 66, 20 N.W.2d
813 (1945) (partnership split into two corporations, 2/3 of the assets being
transferred to one and 1/3 to the other, the five partners becoming equal
shareholders in both corporations); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Board of
Review, 118 Utah 619, 223 P.2d 586 (1950) (two enterprises owned by the
same partnership, incorporated); McNear v. Director of Div. of Emp. Sec.,
327 Mass. 717, 100 N.E.2d 848 (1951) (two corporations established for ac-
counting purposes to conduct auto sales and service business); Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n v. General Engineering Corp., 147 Tex. 503, 217 S.W.2d 659
(1949) (two corporations succeeding partnership); State v. Dallas Liquor
Warehouse No. 4, 147 Tex. 495, 217 S.W.2d 654 (1949) (four corporations suc-
ceeding to stores previously owned by an individual); Pearson Motor Co. v.
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Under state laws requiring that "substantially all" of the prede-
cessor's assets must be acquired by the successor in order to obtain the
former's rate, it is usually considered that anything less than 90% of
the assets is not enough.
6 4
Should the states take advantage of the recent change in the federal
three-year requirement by amending their laws to permit new em-
ployers to qualify for a reduced rate after one year of experience, the
importance of the successorship provisions will be greatly reduced.
INTERSTATE COMPETITION IN RATES
One of the cornerstones of the original Social Security Act was the
fixing of an initial uniform tax rate for unemployment insurance fi-
nancing purposes and thus avoiding interstate competition in tax rates.
The cost advantage for an employer in a state with no unemployment
insurance system over a competing employer in another state with such
a system was obvious.
The ultimate actual effect of the experience-rating system in the area
of interstate competition in unemployment tax rates, however, was not
obvious. 65 The ultimate effect was misjudged primarily because of the
mistaken cost estimates of the system. The three percent tax was con-
sidered, in the light of unemployment experience of the 1920's and
early 1930's, as possibly being too low. 66 It was assumed, further, that
experience rating would provide both high penalty rates above the
standard rate and low rewarding rates below the standard rates, and
that the states would, during a major depression, seek additional
sources of revenue over the 3.0 percent such as contributions from gen-
eral revenues or government loans.
In providing for strictly separate state systems, and at the same time
endeavoring to eliminate or reduce interstate competition in rates, it
is important to recognize that, with or without experience rating, the
Texas Emp. Comm'n, 247 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (two corporations
succeeding to business "of individual).
64. Auclair Transportation, Inc., v. Riley, 96 N.H. 1, 69 A.2d 861 (1949) (89
percent); Russ Dawson, Inc. v. Michigan Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 334 Mich.
82, 53 N.W.2d 693 (1952) (76 percent); Winakor v. Annunzio, 409 Ill. 236, 99
N.E.2d 191 (1951) (65 percent).
65. While the original Congressional Committees had no way of determining
the effect, one member of the House Ways and Means Committee in the 1935
committee hearings did recognize the interstate rate differential possibilities
of the system. Clague, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1945).
66. Of interest are the estimates of unemployment forecast over an eight-
year cycle by the British Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee at
about the same time as the passage of the Social Security Act. The eight-
year average unemployment rate was estimated to be about 17 percent of
the insured population. See PEACOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL INSURANCE
59 (1952). The 3 percent rate was estimated to be adequate to finance only
a modest level of benefits (ten weeks maximum duration and two weeks
waiting period) and was finally accepted because, primarily, it was felt that
the economy could afford no higher rate.
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incidence of unemployment varies sharply between the states, thus
accounting for a large portion of the differences in unemployment com-
pensation costs as between the states. Other factors contribute to these
differences in costs, such as the differences in the benefit and eligibility
conditions, differences in interpretation and administration of the law,
in worker understanding and claim filing propensities, as well as in the
attitudes and participation of employers. The differences between the
states in the incidence of both the volume and the duration of unem-
ployment resulting from varying economic characteristics is .the pri-
mary reason why average costs vary so widely between states. These
cost variations would exist under a flat rate tax as well as under a
differentiated rate system.
The average benefit costs for the seven-year period 1946 tv 1952
inclusive, calculated as a fraction of taxable wages, show a wide
difference between states as do the average contribution yields under
experience rating calculated on the same taxable wage base. The
benefit costs range from 0.3 percent in Texas to 2.2 percent in Cali-
fornia and 3.1 percent in Rhode Island. Contributions collected from
employers showed a similar pattern both as to range and variability-
0.6 percent in the District of Columbia to 2.3 percent in Rhode Island
and Alaska..
This seven-year period, 1946 to 1952, while not representative of a
business cycle, does reflect modern economic conditions. Years of both
moderate and aggravated unemployment are included. The average
benefit costs for the United States as a whole varied from 0.9 percent
in 1951 to 2.3 percent in 1949, while the average level seven-year cost
was 1.4 percent.67 The heavy benefit disbursements of the postwar year
of 1946 and the 1949-50 recession, as well as light benefit-payment
experience, were recorded during this period. The seven-year average
contributions collected from employers was the same as the average
67. This may represent the long-run level cost of unemployment insurance
in the United States, assuming even some improvement in the benefit level
of protection offered by the program. Because of exhaustions and insufficient
wage credits of new entrants in the labor market, compensation for wage
losses resulting from unemployment during a prolonged depression may not be
as great as previously calculated. Control of the modem business cycle through
compensatory fiscal, monetary and other governmental policies may result
in future business fluctuations not much different than the pattern represented
by the 1946-52 period, with the same approximate effect on unemployment
insurance costs. Assuming a rate of unemployment varying from 5 to 10
percent of the labor force over a ten year period, it has been estimated that
a tax rate as low as 1.4 percent would finance benefits at about 50 percent of
taxable wages, dependents benefits, a one week waiting period, 26 weeks of
uniform duration and standard disqualifications. See WomxsxY, PRINCIPLES OF
COST ESTIMATES IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURAN E (Social Security Administra-
tion 1948). The cost of prolonged depression unemployment cannot
properly be considered an unemployment insurance cost; unemployment in-
surance is designed to compensate only for wage loss during relatively short
periods of unemployment. I I
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benefit cost-l.4 percent.68 This experience is represented graphically
by the following chart:
Average collections for unemployment insurance for each state classified
according to the statets average benefit cost, as a percent of taxable
wages, for the seven year period 1946-52 Inclusive.
PERCENT OF PERCENT OF PAYROLLS COLLECTED
PAYROLLS TOTAL 0.0 0.5 0.8' 1.1 1.4- 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9
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The chart shows the variations in the benefit cost as well as the
contribution yields among the fifty-one jurisdictions. The vertical scale
is based on average benefit cost in terms of percentage of taxable pay..
rolls. Each dot represents a jurisdiction. The horizontal scale reflects
the contributions collected during the same seven-year period; and each
jurisdiction with a given benefit cost is plotted according to its contri-
bution yield. The seventeen states located within the double-line band
68. While there are sharp differences in state to state situations, the
fact that nationwide contributions approximated benefits, could be con-
sidered as evidence that the system as a whole under experience rating is
soundly financed, automatically adjusting tax liabilities in accordance with
benefit obligations. The existence of excessive reserves and collections in
states not needing them, and slim reserves and inadequate collections in
states needing greater resources, however, casts doubt on the adequacy of
experience rating as actually operating, state by state, to properly finance
unemployment insurance over a limited period of business fluctuation. Fed-
eral loans or grants to state funds, or some method of reinsurance among
the state funds may, however, correct this deficiency.
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on the chart are those states which, over the period, collected in con-
tributions approximately the same amount that they paid in unemploy-
ment benefits. States below the band did not collect sufficient
contributions to cover their full benefit payments. Seven states are
included in this group. States above the band (twenty-seven) added to
their reserves during the period by collecting more in contributions
than was paid to unemployed workers.69
Interstate unemployment tax differentials for competitive employers
in different states have been widened by individual states adopting
different measures and devices to minimize the tax on the employer
both from the contribution side and the benefit side. Such devices in-
clude lower minimum and maximum rates, crediting of trust fund
interest to employers' accounts, non-charging of benefits, different
systems of experience rating, and stricter disqualification and entitle-
ment conditions for benefits. All of these give the employer an ad-
vantage over his competitor in another state that did not adopt such
devices or impose stricter benefit requirements. The competitive
advantage traceable to these factors is probably small, however, com-
pared to the advantages the employer enjoys by virtue of having his
establishment located in a state with a low rate of unemployment.
For employers who have been subject to the law for a number of
years, the differences between states is even greater than the average
rates would indicate. In eight states, including the lowest cost states
of Texas and Colorado, new employers with less than three years of
experience with unemployment and not yet entitled to a reduced rate,
contributed approximately one-half or more of the 1953 benefit ex-
penditures by paying at a rate of 2.7 percent. In Colorado the
proportion paid by new employers for 1953 amounted to 108 percent
of the total benefit costs.
70
The argument of interstate competition was effectively used to
defeat state proposals for unemployment insurance before the Social
Security Act was passed in 1935.71 In the light of existing sharp varia-
tions in state-to-state tax rates without serious question by competing
employers7 2 there may be doubt regarding the genuineness of the
69. In only five states did benefit costs for the seven-year period, 1946-1952,
equal or exceed 2.0 percent of payrolls: Alaska, 2.0 percent; California, 2.2
percent; New York, 2.1 percent; Rhode Island, 3.1 percent; and Washington,
2.1 percent; of the remaining jurisdictions, forty-one experienced benefit
costs of 1.5 percent or less, with twenty-two of these states below 1.0 percent.
In seven states-Colorado, District of Columbia, Iowa, Nebraska, New
Mexico, South Dakota, and Texas-the benefit costs for the period averaged
0.5 percent or less.
70. In Nevada new employers paid 70 percent, in Arizona 64 percent, and
Texas 47 percent. Under Public Law 767, approved September 1, 1954, new
employers may become eligible for reduced rates with less than three years
of unemployment experience.
71. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21,
.2& (1945).
72. New England textile employers, particularily those located in Rhode
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arguments originally advanced to defeat state legislation in this field.
Wide differences in average state tax rates can be expected to con-
tinue under separate state systems of unemployment insurance with-
out some provision for equalizing the actual benefit costs between the
states.
COUNTER-CYCLICAL FINANCING
Increased attention is being focused on building into unemployment
insurance reserve financing special devices that will produce counter-
cyclical effects. The economic advantages of reserve accumulations
during good times were recognized in the early planning of the
system. 3 Since then, and as a result of the contribution of L6rd
Keynes and his economic analysis of national income, more recognition
has been given to fiscal and taxation policies of the government and
their influence on the economic aggregates of savings, investment, out-
put and employment. Unemployment insurance benefit payments and
reserve policies play an important part in the compensatory fiscal
actions of the government which are designed to achieve and maintain
full employment. The maintenance of consumer spending and demand
through the addition to national income of payments to unemployed
workers in the earliest phases of a developing business cycle permits
the economy to remedy its peculiar illness without the further compli-
cations of a decline in the volume of consumer spending. This ad-
vantage is partially negated if, at the same time, additional business
withdrawals are made in the form of unemployment insurance con-
tributions to finance these benefit payments directly or to rebuild
unemployment reserves drawn down by the benefit expenditures.
Furthermore, unemployment insurance tax withdrawals would reduce
the capacity of business to maintain or expand investments in plant or
equipment. Since business investment expenditures cause a high rate
of consumer spending oscillations, the economic effect of a reduction
in their expenditure is even more pronounced. A part of the problem
Island and Massachusetts, complained about the advantage accruing to their
competitors in the Carolinas and Georgia because of differences in the un-
employment tax rates. The 1946-52 average benefit costs for the principal
southern textile states were about 1.0 percent compared to 1.9 percent for
Massachusetts and 3.1 percent for Rhode Island.
73. The original Committee on Economic Security stated in its report on
unemployment compensation that: "These rights are measured by computa-
tions of the incidence and duration of unemployment over a secular period,
and over the period a balance is maintained between the income and expendi-
tures of the fund. Large reserves must consequently be accumulated in good
years if the anticipated drains of poor years are to be met." SocIAL SECURITY
IN AMERICA 9 (Comm. on Economic Security, Social Security Board, Publication
No. 20 1947). Since 1938 benefits exceeded contributions only in the post-war
year of 1946 when benefits amounted to 1.7 percent of taxable wages, contri-
butions being 1.4 percent of taxable wages; in the 1949-50 recession, when
benefits paid during the two-year period represented about 2.0 percent of
payrolls while collections amounted to 1.4 percent; and in 1954, when benefit
payments reached over $2.0 billion, an all-time high.
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of counter-cyclical financing, then, is to arrange the tax system in such
a manner that increases in unemployment insurance tax rates are
avoided during periods of high or relatively high unemployment. A
uniform or level tax rate would appear to achieve this objective.74
Another approach to counter-cyclical financing would authorize the
accumulation of unemployment reserves in such a fashion that during
low-employment periods the fund could absorb not only the higher
benefit payments, but also allow some tax reductions to employers.
This objective is attainable only if reserves have been liberally
accumulated during prosperous or full-employment periods, a condi-
tion characterizing many of the individual state funds. The desirable
economic effect of such tax reductions are apparent; the political
difficulties of introducing tax reductions at the same time that trust
fund balances are being drawn down by heavy unemployment benefit
payments are also apparent. While the reserve fund may be techni-
cally or actuarially "excessive," public reaction may not sanction
simultaneous tax saving to employers and high benefit payments. On
the other hand with extravagant reserves accumulated, increased
benefits and greater contribution rate reductions will be demanded
despite high level employment conditions.
The possibility of combining tax remissions with benefit expendi-
tures as built-in automatic stabilizers was suggested by the form of
contra-cyclical financing adopted by the British Unemployment In-
surance Statutory Committee and later embodied as a part of the
British National Insurance Act of 1946. While never actually tested
because of the war and transition period, "The scheme.., suggested
that the contributions of both employers and employees should vary
in accordance with the unemployment percentage. Thus with a given
average unemployment percentage of, say, 8, the contribution would
vary inversely with percentages at either side of this average, falling
with increased unemployment and rising with a decrease. In this way,
not only would the employed workers receive a tax remission, but also
employers' prime costs would be reduced and unemployment benefits
could remain at the current level."75
With a worker as well as an employer contribution, the tax re-
missions would have a much broader effect, particularly since the
remissions would be spread over the low-income groups whose spend-
ing propensities would be high.
74. Some attention is being given to establishing employer contribution
rates under experience rating in accordance with conditions designed to
yield an approximate level rate of revenue in terms of taxable wages over
a planned period of seven to ten years, with individal rates varying around
the predetermined rate. One state, Arizona, has adopted a plan which con-
tains the basic feature of a level contribution rate, whch has been established
as 1.3 percent. This rate might change if the reserve, because of unusual condi-
tions, increases or decreases sharply. See ARiz. CODE ANN. § 56-1007d (1939).
75. PEAcOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL INSURANCE 61 (1952),
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Exclusive employer tax reductions, as in the United States, would
increase the employers' capacity to expand capital expenditures, us-
ually associated with causing a high rate of consumer and business
re-spending, at a critical time in the business cycle.
If it should be possible to devise counter-cyclical tax measures that
would be automatically and promptly applied so as to at least avoid
tax increases during the downswing and the trough of the cycle, an
important compensatory fiscal device would be built into the economic
system.
The financing systems under experience rating appear to aggravate
rather than to counter the fluctuations produced by cyclical unemploy-
ment. In the view of some, contribution rates have been reduced too
generously during recent high-level employment periods; 76 this effect
as well as increases in rates during low-level employment periods
seems to be implicit in the practical functioning of experience rating
as it is presently designed.
There is disagreement with the proposition that existing experience-
rating systems fail or are incapable of producing counter-cyclical tax
effects. Reserve-ratio systems, it is claimed by some, can be made an
effective instrument of counter-cyclical financing for the individual
employer and simultaneously, then, for the economy as a whole. While
no meaningful experience is yet available to test the strength of this
contention, it is clear that the reserve-ratio plans do enjoy counter-
cyclical advantages over benefit-replacement systems such as the
benefit-ratio plan. 7 The influence of the changes in the payroll of an
employer subject to a reserve-ratio experience-rating law may pro-
duce, within limits, a desirable economic effect for the individual
employer. Assuming no significant change in benefit experience, an
increase in payrolls will produce a lower reserve ratio and therefore
a higher contribution rate. While this may be identified by some as
a type of counter-cyclical effect, the real reason for the rate increase is
the greater exposure to the risk of unemployment. 8 A decrease in pay-
76. The Advisory Council on Social Security reported in 1948 that under
its proposals for a minimum contribution rate (0.6 percent employer and 0.6
percent worker contribution), "experience rating in most states could not
operate to reduce the income of the system to a point which would threaten
adequate benefit standards. Furthermore, the minimum rate would place
a limit on the tendency of most experience rating plans to reduce contribu-
tion rates in prosperous times just when general economic principles dictate
peak rates, and correspondingly would limit the increase in rates in periods
of growing unemployment when it is desirable to have low rates." UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE, A REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, FROM THE
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SEN. Doc. No. 206, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 34 (1948).
77. See a study of Muskegon, Michigan, the case of the declining payrolls.
FINANCING METHODS, BENEFIT STRUCTURE, COSTS OF MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE 58-62 (Report of the Michigan Employment Security Commission
1953).
78. Because of the statutory limit of $3000 on taxable wages at a time when
actual annual wages in covered employment average above that amount,
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rolls resulting from a reduction in the number of workers employed,
or a substantial cut in work hours, will by itself reduce the employer's
contribution rate and his tax liability; however, under these circum-
stances, benefits can be expected to increase offsetting the advantage
of the lower payroll experience. Higher unemployment tax rates for
the individual employer appear likely under these conditions.
When there is general unemployment of a cyclical nature, higher
unemployment insurance tax rates appear inevitable under existing
experience-rating systems, including reserve-ratio systems, even
though the impact of the increase, both as to timing and degree, may
be different for different plans.
Should counter-cyclical financing and the fixing of tax rates in un-
employment insurance be designed from the viewpoint of the indi-
vidual employer or from the point of view of the economy as a whole?
The first approach, that of the individual employer, presupposes a col-
lective benefit to be derived, automatically, out of meeting the
individual employer's need for tax relief, and a chance to accumulate
an adequate individual reserve. This would be timed in relationship
with the employer's peculiar individual circumstances of economic
misfortune or success which may or may not coincide with the gen-
erally prevailing cyclical condition. This view is in complete harmony
with the stabilization and cost objectives of individual employer ex-
perience rating. On the other hand, if the purpose is to achieve a gen-
eral economic counter-cyclical effect as regards the economy as a
whole, which economically appears preferable, then an overriding ad-
justment must be made in all employer rates, irrespective of individual
experience, and these adjustments must be tied to some general
economic indicators.
79
the changes in the taxable wage base reflect to a great extent increases in
the number of workers employed and thus exposed, as individuals, to the
risk of unemployment. Payroll expansion or contraction either in the form
of wage rate changes or changes in hours of work (when the average work
week is relatively high), are frequently not reflected in the exposure base.
The $3000 limit does adequately cover wages used by states in computing
benefits.
79. Relevant to this question of the behavior of the individual firm within
a business cycle pattern, see a description of Wesley C. Mitchell's concept of
business cycles in BuRNs, THE FRONTIERS OF ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE 112-14, 194
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Number 57, 1954). Wisconsin has
provided for such a system by linking a reduction in contribution rates to
changes in total state wages and salaries. A decrease of 5 percent or more
over the previous year's total payrolls in the state when the total reserve fund
is $25 million or more, requires the Wisconsin Industrial Commission to
invoke an adjusted rate schedule. In the rate schedules provision is made
for three levels of payroll decreases: 5 percent to 10 percent; 10 percent to 15
percent; and over 15 percent. The counter-cyclical tax remissions vary under
each schedule and are different in each schedule for the nine rate categories
of the law. The maximum remission under the schedule applicable when wages
decrease more than 15 percent is 1.1 percent. Employers under the normal
schedule with a zero rate receive no counter-cyclical rate adjustment. See




Experience rating over the past fifteen years has profited in its
growth and acceptance by forces and developments which were
foreign to the system's basic objectives. At the same time, because of
these developments, experience rating lost a real chance to test and
prove the strength of its basic objectives.
Experience rating was given credit by many employers for reducing
their tax burden in the field of unemployment insurance and the
system has consequently become very popular. The experience-rating
system was, however, only the method used in achieving the reduced
rates; the real forces responsible for the sharp reduction in contribu-
tion rates to a very large number of employers in practically all states
were over-financing, under-benefiting, and the high levels of employ-
ment and payrolls during the war and post-war periods.
The ultra-conservatism of the original cost estimates fixing the 3.0
percent Federal Unemployment Tax rate produced an apparent tax
savings of around 50 percent which is both a windfall and a handicap
to experience rating. A large proportion of the experience rating
savings is to a considerable extent illusory because the federal 3.0
percent rate and, in most states, the standard rate of 2.7 percent are
too high. The same general result might have been achieved by lower-
ing the standard rate by amendment at both the federal and state
levels, with a considerable increase in efficiency and a corresponding
decrease in administrative costs.
The extraordinarily high level of employment and payrolls resulting
from the war improved the condition of the state funds, the experience
of individual employers, and, at the same time, the capacity of the
system to grant tax reductions. This improvement resulted from low
benefit outlays as well as expanded employment and payrolls for con-
tribution purposes. Reduced contribution rates became more or less
automatic without much attention or concern from employers.
On the other hand, experience rating, with its system of preferential
treatment of employers with more stable employment, has satisfied and
continues to satisfy a vital need in the growth of unemployment insur-
ance in the United States. It was the only available method of adjusting
the revenues to the benefit demands, and correcting the unreasonably
high original cost estimate and tax rate. Other statutory adjust-
ments in these rates could have been made; but the fact.remains that
the additional credit provisions of the federal law, together with the
experience rating systems of the state laws, provided the only available
channel for achieving a technically and economically desirable reduc-
tion in the average tax rate in practically all the states.
Experience rating was also a substantial factor in the general ac-
ceptance of unemployment insurance by American industry, and in
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securing their cooperation in the administration of the law. Experi-
ence rating, being a part of the functioning of the system, placed
unemployment insurance on familiar ground, somewhat akin to com-
mercial, private insurance with its system of preferred risks, but still
with the advantage of state-wide pooling of the risks from the point of
view of benefits. The built-in stabilization incentives have popular
acceptance by American industry even though their effect, admittedly,
is limited.
The same experience rating incentives continue to be criticized on
the grounds that rather than reducing unemployment they tend only
to reduce benefits, which is the common measure of the amount of
unemployment attributable to the employer.
The systems of experience rating in unemployment insurance must
adjust to certain recent developments. With average contribution
rates now approximating average current benefit costs, employers are
being assigned rates above the average to about the same extent that
they are being assigned rates below theaverage. Should there be tny
substantial increase in unemployment, most of the rates will be driven
upward. If benefit scales are liberalized, a similar effect will be pro-
duced; and should earlier reduced rates be granted to new employers,
which is now possible under the federal law, the rates of many estab-
lished employers in some states will very probably be increased.
Under these circumstances, experience rating could be blamed for the
increases even though the real reasons lie elsewhere.
The guaranteed-annual-wage plans proposed for collective bargain-
ing are being justified on the same theoretical grounds as experience
rating in unemployment insurance. The opposition of industry to these
plans will clash, to some extent at least, with the theoretical grounds
supporting experience rating, just as labor, in attempting to justify
guaranteed-annual-wage plans, will clash with their theoretical oppo-
sition to experience rating.
Also, the question of individual employer experience rating is likely
to receive further attention by Congress as well as state legislatures.
The compulsory features of the additional credit requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code have created some resentment in the states.
The sharp differences between states in the costs of unemployment
insurance undoubtedly will provoke continuing interest in ways and
means of equalizing to some degree the costs between the states, and
of minimizing competition between the states in reducing contribution
rates and in devising stricter disqualifying and eligibility conditions.
The high cost states, of course, have the greatest interest in these pro-
posals.
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